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It’s the Opportunity Cost, Stupid! How Self-Employment 
Responds to Financial Incentives of Return, Risk and Skew
* 
 
There is no robust empirical support for the effect of financial incentives on the decision to 
work in self-employment rather than as a wage earner. In the literature, this is seen as a 
puzzle. We offer a focus on the opportunity cost, i.e. the wages given up as an employee. 
Information on income from self-employment is of inferior quality and this is not just a 
problem for the outside researcher, it is an imminent problem of the individual considering 
self-employment. We also argue that it is not only the location of an income distribution that 
matters and that dispersion and (a)symmetry should not be ignored. We predict that higher 
mean, lower variance and higher skew in the wage distribution in a particular employment 
segment reduce the inclination to prefer self-employment above employee status. Using a 
sample of 56,000 recent graduates from a Dutch college or university, grouped in 
approximately 120 labor market segments, we find significant support for these propositions. 
The results survive various robustness checks on specifications and assumptions. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Imagine someone just graduating from school and considering whether to work as an employee or in self-
employment. Economists perceive that differences in income will be among the factors determining the 
choice. But obtaining information on potential income from self-employment is a formidable job, much 
more so than obtaining information on potential pay as an employee. There are far fewer self-employed 
workers than employees with a given education to act as informants, accounting rules for exactly determining 
income from independent business are not unequivocal, the range of possible outcomes is much wider and 
often not even foreseeable, professional abilities and competences, as determinants of potential income, are 
harder to predict than performance in a controlled employee status and the environment for a self-employed 
worker is inherently more dynamic. The literature often stresses that a researcher is unable to obtain good, 
reliable data on self-employment income for econometric analysis. We argue that this is not just a problem 
for the outside researcher, but an imminent problem that also confronts the subject of her research.  
Effects of financial incentives in the choice between employee or self-employment status have been 
hard to establish, but given the problems noted above this should in fact be no surprise. There is a marked 
asymmetry in the quality of information on potential income from self-employment and from employee 
status. Therefore, in our model of the choice of employment status, we will focus on the opportunity cost of 
self-employment rather than on the benefits. Indeed, we report robust support for the moments of the wage 
distribution as determinants of the decision to become self-employed. A lower mean wage income in one’s 
labor market segment increases the probability of choosing for self-employment. Higher variance and lower 
skew in the distribution of wage incomes also increase it. And as in most of the literature, we find no effect of 
self-employment income.  
The weak and mixed results on the effect of financial incentives in the choice for self-employment 
have been presented as “something of a puzzle since they suggest that entrepreneurs do not respond robustly 
to pecuniary incentives.... However, there is so much economic evidence that individuals adjust their behavior 
in response to changes in relative prices that it would be puzzling if the same calculus ceased to apply entirely 
in the realm of entrepreneurship as an occupational choice.’ (Parker, p. 110).
1 Both Astebro (2010) and 
Parker (2009) stress the information problem as a prominent factor in potential explanations for the puzzle. 
Parker (2009, p 110) refers to poor data quality and measurement error as common phenomena in observed 
entrepreneurial earnings levels. In fact, entrepreneurial incomes remain often unreported or, if not, they are 
systematically underreported, both in tax filings and public surveys. Astebro even refers to lack of interest 
among the self-employed: ‘Entrepreneurs are wary of revealing accurate income data to third parties’ 
(Astebro, 2010, p. 36). Both authors note the difficulties in extracting uniform entrepreneurial income 
measures from the reported data and make them comparable to wage earnings. Some researchers define the 
                                                 
1 Hyytinen et al. (2008) call this the ‘returns to entrepreneurship puzzle’, see also Astebro (2010) or Hamilton (2000). 
We are aware of the fact that “entrepreneur” and “self-employed” are not identical concepts. We use “entrepreneur” 
only when we discuss the literature. When we present our own results, we will refer to self-employment.     3
entrepreneur’s income as the amount the entrepreneur draws from the firm on an annual basis, whereas other 
researchers use the firm’s net profit, or alternatively, the sum of the value growth of the firm and ‘draw’ as a 
proxy of the entrepreneur’s income (Parker, 2009, p. 363).
2 
3 No doubt, this lack of a uniform concept of 
self-employment income is also a problem for individuals who consider self-employment.  
Not only researchers, but also the subjects themselves will have a much sharper picture of the 
opportunity cost of self-employment than of the income it will bring. It is even conceivable they actually care 
more about opportunity cost than about financial returns, as non-pecuniary benefits are often found to be 
among the key arguments for preferring self-employment: autonomy (Benz and Frey, 2008), a tendency 
towards entrepreneurship caused by genetic factors (Nicolaou, Cherkas, Hunkin and Spector, 2008), cognitive 
biases arising from overoptimism (Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006; Dushnitsky, 2010) and/or overconfidence 
(Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin, 2006). A focus on financial opportunity cost rather than on financial returns 
aligns well with this perspective on potentially self-employed workers.  
We do not only consider the opportunity cost in terms of mean incomes, but we acknowledge the 
possibility that utility differences between the two options will, more in general, also result from entirely 
different probability distributions of incomes offered. No doubt, the three dominant characteristics of a 
distribution are location, dispersion and (a)symmetry. Higher variance in earnings of entrepreneurs compared 
to employees is a stylized fact (Astebro, 2010; Parker, 2009) and requires a risk premium for risk averse 
individuals (King, 1974; Cramer et al., 2002; Caliendo et al., 2009; Bonin et al., 2007). Recent studies have also 
provided evidence that the distribution of entrepreneurial earnings has stronger (positive) skew than the wage 
distribution. Skew may play a role for entrepreneurship choices as ‘a few extremely high prices have a 
disproportionately great attractive force’, Marshall (1890, 1930, p. 554). Indeed, economic theory has 
established that declining absolute risk aversion, an almost inevitable hypothesis, requires a positive 
appreciation of skew (Astebro et al., 2009; Tsiang, 1972; Hartog, 2011). The relevance of skew in choices 
under uncertainty has been demonstrated in several applications such as gambling and betting (Garrett and 
Sobel, 1999; Golec and Tamarkin, 1998) or in the literature of lifetime wealth accumulation, where the 
appreciation of skew is called prudence (Gollier, 2001, p 238). A positive premium for variance and a negative 
premium for skew in wages across different types of educations, established for several countries in different 
settings (Hartog, 2011) indicates that variance and skew are relevant for choice of education cum occupation. 
Not accounting for the second and third moments of the income distributions may flaw the comparison and 
thus be an explanatory factor in the lack of consistent support of the role of financial incentives.  
 
                                                 
2 An additional complicating factor is that many business owners do not earn ‘business incomes’ but pay themselves 
a wage in their incorporated business. If this is the case, the entrepreneur can hardly be distinguished from a wage 
employee. Entrepreneurs often incorporate their business when they have personnel and thus run larger (and more 
successful) firms. The difficulty of distinguishing these entrepreneurs from wage employees may thus lead to a 
smaller sample of entrepreneurs and underestimates of true entrepreneurial earnings. 
3 Researchers may also deal incorrectly with the entrepreneurs’ negative incomes and with top-coding or may 
erroneously include ‘returns to capital’ to their (labor) income measures (Parker, 2009, p. 368).   4
  We derive propositions from a simple model on the role of financial incentives for the choice between 
self-employment and wage employment. Our observations are individuals in self-employment or wage 
employment who recently graduated from more than 100 different types of tertiary education. We argue, 
precisely based on the arguments outlined above, that the individuals are poorly informed on incomes from 
self-employment and we focus on the effects of moments of the distribution of wage income. We predict 
that a higher mean wage income increases the opportunity costs of self-employment and thus reduces the 
probability of entrepreneurship. A higher variance pushes up the inclination to self-employment, as one gives 
up a more risky alternative. A higher skew, the third moment, reduces this inclination as one would give up a 
better probability to end up in an extended upper tail of the wage distribution. By simultaneously analyzing 
the effects of the first three moments of the wage distribution we squarely acknowledge one of the caveats 
discussed above, the incompleteness of a comparison based on only mean (or median) income levels.  
By focusing on opportunity cost as expressed in the wage distribution, we avoid the problem of poor 
measurement of self-employment income. We do so by estimating our model on data covering 118 labor 
market segments defined from detailed information about major track in field of study of 56,000 graduates. 
The data apply to new graduates who enter the labor force for the first time and have not yet been tied up in 
any of the alternatives. As a consequence our sample is homogeneous in terms of (no) labor market 
experience and education level.  
The validity of our approach hinges on three assumptions. The first assumption is made when 
defining labor market segments as fields of study with well defined curriculums in vocational colleges or 
universities leading to a specific degree (e.g sociology, physics, fiscal law, food technology, etc). We postulate 
that the relevant distribution of wages is defined by individuals with a particular type of education. We thus 
assume intra-group homogeneity in terms of the earnings distributions facing the individuals (Reich et al., 
1973) relative to the wage distribution across labor market segments. We assess the validity of this assumption 
by also considering a random grouping into labor market segments.   
Second, we assume that individuals know the distribution of wages within their labor market 
segment but do not know the education specific distribution of income from self-employment. Thus, we 
assume that students only observe a general distribution of earnings generated by self-employment that is 
common for all labor market segments. The assumption is motivated by the verifiable facts that there are very 
few entrepreneurs within each labor market segment and that their incomes are less observable. In our 
robustness checks, we use as much information on self-employment income as our data allow. But even if 
the assumption were violated, this would be econometrically harmless as long as the moments of the 
distributions of wages and of self-employment incomes are independent.
4 We find no evidence of strong 
correlations between any of the three moments of the two income distributions; our sensitivity checks are 
compatible with (modest) underestimation of effects of opportunity cost.   
                                                 
4  If the financial attractiveness of the entrepreneurship option were positively correlated with the financial 
attractiveness of the alternative, this would lead to a downward bias of the true effect. On the contrary, if there were 
a negative correlation between these two distributions, the effect of pecuniary return, risk and skew in wage 
employment on entrepreneurship choices would be overestimated.   5
  The third assumption is that there are no confounding factors underlying the choice for a particular 
field of study that affect both its wage distribution and the likelihood of self-employment. We discuss the role 
of risk attitude, ability and immanent distribution of productivity by education and we claim that our results 
survive concerns on these grounds.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical model and the 
resulting propositions. In Section 3 we discuss the data. In Section 4 we present results of testing the 
propositions and assumptions. Section 5 concludes. 
      
 
2. Theoretical model and propositions 
 
A graduate entering working life, after completing an education, has a choice between self-employment and 
working for a wage as an employee. Both options bring financial returns (w as wage earner, p as self-
employed) and non-pecuniary returns (). Non-pecuniary returns reflect the individual’s appreciation of the 
relevant characteristics of self-employment versus employee work such as autonomy (Hyytinen et al., 2008), 
the differential scope of activities and tasks (Benz and Frey, 2008), the greater insecurity in other dimensions 
than income (Hamilton, 2000) and a different social status (Parker and Van Praag, 2010).  
We assume that the utility derived from working, either as a self-employed entrepreneur (SE) or as a 
wage employee (WW), is linearly separable in the utility derived from w or p  and : 
 
UWW U(w)U(WW)        ( 1 a )  
USE U(p)U(SE)          ( 1 b )  
 
Assuming separability implies that the valuation of these non-pecuniary aspects is independent of income. 
Graduates base their occupational choice on a comparison of expected utility levels in each of the 
occupations. The likelihood of choosing self-employment can thus be derived from: 
 
P(SE)  P[E(USE)  E(UWW)]       ( 2 )  
 
Substituting (1) in (2) and expressing the differences in expected utility derived from non-pecuniary factors in 
both occupations within the same segment
5 by a (latent) individual specific variable 
(( ) ) (( ) ) WW SE EU EU    , it follows that 
 
P(SE)  P[  E(U(p)) E(U(w))]        ( 3 )  
 
                                                 
5 Segments are defined by education, see below.   6
where  remains unobserved and reflects the individual-specific difference in non-pecuniary returns between 
self-employment and wage-employment within the given labor market segment. Suppose the wage 
distribution (w) and entrepreneurial income distribution (p) are characterized by the following parameters: 
 









3     (5) 
 
Using Taylor series approximation, we derive expressions for the expected utility of wage-employment versus 
self-employment in equations (6) and (7), respectively, where U(w) is expanded around y  (the expected 
income level for graduates, i.e., a weighed average ofw and p) 
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Substituting these expressions in (3), we obtain: 
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where the constant term a absorbs all that has been left out. Equation (8) expresses a standard probit (or 
logit) model for the choice of self-employment status vis-a-vis the alternative of wage employment. The 
coefficients can be estimated if we observe sufficient numbers of sufficiently distinct observations for the 
distribution of wages (w) and self-employment incomes (p).  
Employment segments are defined by field of education, as we take individuals’ education as 
completed. This does not rule out potential substitution with graduates from other fields: the effects are 
simply included in the observed wage distribution. Presumably, individuals consider their perspective over 
some time horizon.
6 We assume that individuals, when deciding on their employment status, know the 
parameters of the wage distribution but do not know where in the wage distribution they would end up if 
                                                 
6 An implicit assumption of our approach is that the distribution of wages among recent graduates adequately 
characterizes the distribution over that horizon. This may be justified by a high correlation of distribution 
parameters for different experience lengths and by the fact that the individual may still be unaware of the duration 
of his commitment.   7
choosing wage employment.  We take our observations from 118 distinct wage distributions (k = 118 labor 
market segments defined by a degree field).
7 
For the reasons outlined in the introduction, graduates have far less information on self-employment 
incomes, let alone self-employment incomes specific to their field of education. We will assume they will use 
the parameters for self-employment income without differentiating by field of education. In an analysis of 
self-employment by field of education, the self- employment income prospects are then identical for all 
individuals and will reduce to a constant; thus, attention fully falls on the parameters of the opportunity cost. 
 There is no need to deny that originally, this assumption arose out of necessity: with often less than 
10 self-employed workers per field one cannot reliably characterize a distribution.  But upon reflection, it is 
not as extreme as it may perhaps seem at first sight. We do not compare highly educated professionals to the 
local grocery store owner or to a self-employed carpenter: all our respondents have completed tertiary 
education. And it is actually quite conceivable that subjects indeed use much cruder information on self-
employment income than on employee income. To them, just as to us, information on self-employment 
income is limited by data and definition problems and has often low reliability. These problems are 
aggravated if one desires information by field of education, with very few examples around to assess income 
from self-employment. Perhaps, subjects even care little about precise information as other aspects of self-
employment matter much more to them. In our robustness tests, we check the validity of the assumption to 
the extent we can: we include self-employment income parameters by field of education for a subsample with 
sufficient numbers of observed self-employed workers and we also estimate with self-employment income 
parameters for aggregates of intrinsically related fields of education. Our core conclusions easily survive.  We 
may note that, statistically, the only requirement is independence: if the variation in the distribution of self-
employment income is independent of the variation in the distribution of wages, our estimates are unbiased.
8  
Under this assumption we can estimate the parameters b, c and d by means of the following probit-
equation, where a absorbs the effect of the common income distribution for entrepreneurs:  
 
P(SE)  P[i  a bw cw
2  dw
3]     (9) 
 
The coefficients b, c and d are defined in the first, second and third derivative of the utility function; we take 
them here as positive numbers.  With utility increasing in the first moment (from a taste for consumption), 
the second derivative of utility negative (from risk aversion) and the third derivative positive (from skew 
affection, as implied by declining absolute risk aversion, cf Tsang, 1972), we predict that the probability of 
self-employment among graduates from a field of education will decrease in the mean of the wage 
                                                 
7 In the Netherlands, tertiary education is not characterized by a major, but it is a field defined by a specific 
curriculum right from the beginning, e.g. economics or chemistry.  
8 This holds conditional on ignoring higher moments in our Taylor series expansion of the utility function.   8
distribution in that field, increase in the variance of wages and decrease in the skew of wages for the 






In this section, we shall first discuss briefly the relevant features of the Dutch educational system. We will 
then discuss the data sources and descriptive statistics. 
 
3.1  The Dutch system of higher education 
In the Netherlands, 52 vocational colleges and 14 universities offer programs in higher education. Both 
types of post- secondary education offer a broad array of study programs at the Bachelor level. During 
the time period captured by our data, universities offered only combined four-year programs leading to a 
Master’s degree, whereas the vocational colleges offer more practically oriented bachelor programs of 
four years.10 Students starting these programs were typically 18 years old and fresh from high school. The 
number of students in the academic year 2008/2009 who graduated from vocational colleges with a 
bachelor degree was 52,000, whereas the number of students that entered the labor market with a Master 
degree was approximately 28,000.  
 
3.2  Data sources and definitions 
Our sample consists of 79,415 recent graduates from tertiary education. It is a random draw of approximately  
7,500 recent graduates per annum in the years 1999 to 2008, from a yearly survey to monitor the labor market 
outcomes of graduates in the 118 largest degree fields, half in higher vocational education and half in 
university education fields. The special feature of the monitor is the detailed information on study 
background and early career earnings of many individuals in many degree fields in tertiary education. 
Individuals fill out extensive questionnaires about their study program and grades, the activities they 
undertook as a student, individual background and current labor market situation, such as job search 
activities, occupational status (unemployed, self-employed, wage-employed) and details about their income. 
They do so, on average, 20 months after graduation, in January. Thus, our sample includes graduates from 
the academic years 1997/1998 until 2006/2007.  
  The Dutch research institute SEO has been commissioned by the prominent weekly magazine 
                                                 
9 We have abstracted from the fact that the derivatives and hence the coefficients will vary with  w  . Presumably, 
this is a small, secondary, effect.  
10 The bachelor master (BAMA) structure was introduced in the Dutch system of higher education in 2002-2003. 
The first graduations within the new structure took place in 2005-2006 (academic bachelor program of 3 years) and 
2006-2007. Only the last wave of observations (January, 2008) may theoretically include these university bachelor 
graduates since the 2008 wave is held among graduates of the academic year 2005-2006. The few students who 
entered the labor market with an academic bachelor degree in the first possible year, i.e., 2005-2006 are not included 
in the 2008 sample. Therefore, the distinction between a degree from a vocational college and a university is implied 
by the distinction between bachelor and masters degrees.    9
Elsevier to gather and analyze these data. Elsevier publishes a leading special issue every year about the labor 
market prospects of the 118 specific degree fields (80% of all graduates from tertiary education have degrees 
from these fields).11 Appendix Tables A1 and A2 list all vocational and academic degree fields respectively 
(first column) and the number of wage-employed and self-employed observations in each (second column).  
  Our dependent variable is occupational status. It is based on the answer to the question: “What is 
your status in the labor market at the moment?” We are interested in particular in the distinction between 
self-employed entrepreneurship and wage employment. Table 1 shows how the distribution of individuals 
among the various answering categories (and non-response, small sized labor market segments or age) 
diminishes our effective sample size from 79,415 to 56,138 graduates. Respondents could select only one, the 
most applicable category. 
  The second key variable is the income distribution per labor market segment.  To estimate equation 
(9), we need observations on the three moments w,   w
2 and w
3 . Calculated moments of the wage 
distribution per degree field are based on the wages of employed respondents in the field who report their 
income.
12 Income data for the various years are expressed in real terms (for the year 2008) by correcting for 
inflation (consumer price index). Hourly wages are calculated as monthly income divided by the reported 
number of hours worked per month. Hourly wages below 5 euro have been set to missing, given the 
minimum wage laws that apply. Wages higher than three standard deviations above the average wage level in 
their degree field have also been set as missing. Deleting outliers is relevant because the moments of the wage 
distribution are sensitive to extreme values.
13  
  
Table 1  
Definition of the sample 
Initial sample size  79,415
Inactive in the labor market   12,335
Temporary workers   3,083
Education degree field unknown   342
Education degree field small (n<50)  343
Graduate age >30  7,175
Effective sample size  56,138
 
 
3.3 Descriptive  statistics 
As shown in Table 2, the average (median) number of individuals in our sample with identical degrees is 476 
(465). This defines the average (median) size of the 118 labor market segments. The largest labor market 
segment includes 1502 individuals (economics, Msc), the smallest only 59 (horticulture and agriculture, Bsc). 
                                                 
11 The data have been obtained with the permission of Elsevier and SEO Economic Research.  
12 Tables A1 and A2 show the wage moments and the numbers of observations per degree field with a wage 
income. 
13Hourly self-employed entrepreneurial incomes are calculated likewise, although ‘outliers’ are not excluded. For self-
employed entrepreneurs, minimum wages do not apply and occasional very high incomes may occur. Therefore, and also 
because of the low number of observations we start from, we do not delete extreme values in the income distribution of 
entrepreneurs. All results remain qualitatively the same when we delete these observations from the self-employed 
income distribution (or, alternatively, when we do not delete extreme observations from the wage income distributions).    10
Only 3.6 percent of labor market participants are self-employed.
14 It is a common finding that the self-
employment rate among recent graduates is very low (Parker, 2009). Table 2 also shows that the fraction of 
entrepreneurs varies considerably per degree field. The minimum is zero. This applies to 3 out of 118 degree 
fields: “Food technology” (Bachelor), “Special needs teacher” (Bachelor) and “Language and culture” 
(Master). The three degree fields with the highest fraction of entrepreneurs are “Visual arts & design” 
(Bachelor) with a fraction of 35%, “Theater” (Bachelor, 20%) and “Dance” (Bachelor, 19%).
15 These 
education degrees are all offered in the vocational colleges. The degree fields in universities with the highest 
fractions of entrepreneurs are “Film, television and theater studies” (13%) and “Industrial design” (12%).  
  
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics: Labor market segments, occupational choice and sample sizes 
  Individuals (n)  Per degree field (k =118) 
   Average  Med  Std  dev  Min  Max 
# labor market participants  56,138  476  465  274  59  1502 
# wage earners, income known  51,080 437  424  259  33  1418 
# self-employed, income known  1,538  13  9 18  0  152 
% self-employed  3.64  4.3  2.6  5.8  0  37 
% wage earners, income known  94.4%           
% self-employed, income known  75.2%           
 
  Only 75 percent of the self-employed report earnings, a clear illustration of our claim in the 
introduction that ‘Entrepreneurs are wary of revealing accurate income data to third parties’ (Astebro, p. 36, 
2010). The combination of a much lower number of self-employed than wage earners per segment and the 
lower response rates to questions about earnings among self-employed induces us to use the self-employment 
income data with great caution only. The average (median) number of self-employed per labor market 
segment who report their income is only 13 (9). Moreover, only 50 out of the 118 labor market segments 
include at least ten observed incomes of self-employed. The number of labor market segments with at least 
20 observed incomes for self-employed is only 19.  
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the wage distributions across individuals (first column) and 
labor market segments (right hand side columns) in terms of the first three central moments, i.e. w,  w
2 and 
w
3  from equation 9. The table shows that labor market segments are not terribly different in terms of the 
average wage income, ranging from 8.54 to 13.13 per hour with a standard deviation of 0.837. However, the 
variance of the wage incomes within a labor market segments as well as the skew vary widely across 
segments. In particular, the standard deviation of w
3
 is very large. The wage variance and skew in the 
population of wage earners are larger than the average variance and skew within labor market segments. 
                                                 
14 The percentage of entrepreneurs in the sample of individuals differs from the percentage of entrepreneurs in the 
sample of labor market segments, due to the fact that labor market segments vary in size leading to a different 
weighing of individual observations.  
15  The degree field with the highest fraction of entrepreneurs is also the one with the highest number of 
entrepreneurs, i.e. 240.   11
The lower half of Table 3 shows the (available) statistics of the distribution of entrepreneurial 
income, p.  The usual comparison to the wage distribution applies. Self-employment incomes are somewhat 
higher on average (11.2 versus 10.2) with a lower median level (9.5 versus 9.8). The variance is more than 12 
times larger than the wage variance for employees (77 versus 6).  The skew of the p -distribution is almost 100 
times the skew of w (3260 versus 34). Consistent with the picture painted by the upper half of Table 3, the 
variance and skew of p, like for w, are particularly large across labor market segments, more so than within. 
 
 
Table 3  
Descriptive statistics of the wage and self-employment income distributions 




k =118 Labor market segments/degree fields 
 
Income statistics in 
€/h 
Mean Mean Std  dev Min  Max
w  10.244 10.081 0.837 8.540  13.128
w
2  6.017 5.168 3.801 .886  32.352
w
3  33.683 25.173 57.441 -.0449  450.99
Median of w  9.848  9.975  
Self-employed, incomes known,  (np = 1,538)    Labor market segments/degree fields 
(k = 50, includes segments >= 10 observations of p) 
p  11.241 11.471 2.357 7.136  18.404
 p
2  77.194 62.744 82.109 9.730  411.670
p
3  3260 2172 5934 -15.066  29144
Median of p  9.490  10.550  
*The statistics for wage income earners, when based on the same selection of 50 labor market segments as the sample 
for which the self-employment income statistics are shown, are similar to those for k=118. 
 
  
The upper left quadrant of Table 4 depicts the correlation levels between the first three central 
moments of the wage distribution of each of the labor market segments. These correlation levels are all 
positive. The correlation between   and w
3 amounts to 0.92 and points to problems of multicollinearity. At 
that level we cannot trust estimates of separate effects of variance and skew at face value, especially if the 
standard errors are large and the coefficient estimates change by much in response to small changes in the 
model (in terms of adding/excluding either variables or observations). We therefore consider not only the 
second and third moments of the wage distribution but in an alternative set of specifications replace them by 
the (standardized) coefficient of variation (w w ) and the commonly used (scale free) measure of skew 
 w
3 / w
3 , respectively. The lower left quadrant of Table 4 shows that using these scale free measures of risk 
and skew reduces the three relevant correlations to the manageable levels of 0.29, -0.04 and 0.56 respectively.  
We pursue a second way of alleviating the potential multicollinearity problem by a visual inspection 
of the 118 data-points in the space defined by w
2 (on the horizontal axis) and w
3 (on the vertical axis), see 
Figure 1.  
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistic: Correlations between the moments of the wage distribution in labor market segments 
  k=118 labor market segments    k=114 labor market segments 
  w  w
2  w
3    w w   w  w
2  w
3  w w  
w  1.000          1.000     
w
2  0.543 1.000        0.433  1.000     
w
3   0.384  0.919 1.000     0.071  0.689 1.000  
w w    0.294  0.894 0.798   1.000  0.061  0.909 0.702 1.000 
 w
3 / w




Descriptive statistic: the relationship between w
2
 and w
3 for k = 118 labor market segments 
 
 
The figure indicates that excluding the four labor market segments in the upper right part of the graph may 
decrease the correlation between risk and skew substantially. The four labor market segments that are 
excluded –from right to left- are ‘physiotherapy (Bachelor)’, ‘music (Bachelor)’, ‘logopedy’ (Bachelor), and 
‘pedagogy’ (Master). This decreases the correlation between w
2
 and w
3 successively from 0.92 to 0.85, 0.81, 
0.75 to, finally, 0.68 for k =114. The right hand side of Table 4 shows all resulting correlations. In the sequel, 
we consider four sets of analyses; with scaled versus unscaled measures of risk and skew and with k= 118 
versus k=114. This will reduce the impact of multicollinearity problems and show the robustness of the 
results to changes in the setup of the measures and the sample.  
  Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the control variables that are included in the regression 
equations, either as a further test of robustness or as a test of assumptions. The factors that are commonly 
used to explain the variation in self-employment choices in a sample of labor market participants are included 
(Parker, 2009). These are labor market characteristics (year and region), personal characteristics (gender, age,   13




Table 5  
Descriptive statistics of the control variables 






  Mean St  Dev Mean St  Dev Mean St  Dev 
Labor market characteristics 
Year = 1999 (dummy)  0.110  0.313 0.110 0.313 0.115 0.319 
Year = 2000 (dummy)  0.096  0.295 0.095 0.293 0.099 0.299 
Year = 2001 (dummy)  0.090  0.286 0.090 0.286 0.083 0.276 
Year = 2002 (dummy)  0.086  0.280 0.086 0.280 0.077 0.267 
Year = 2003 (dummy)  0.100  0.300 0.102 0.303 0.062 0.241 
Year = 2004 (dummy)  0.103  0.304 0.104 0.305 0.080 0.271 
Year = 2005 (dummy)  0.118  0.323 0.118 0.323 0.126 0.332 
Year = 2006 (dummy)  0.106  0.308 0.106 0.308 0.121 0.326 
Year = 2007 (dummy)  0.112  0.315 0.110 0.313 0.139 0.346 
Year = 2008 (dummy)  0.079  0.270 0.079 0.270 0.099 0.299 
Region South of NL (dummy)  0.205 0.404 0.206 0.404 0.174 0.379 
Region North of NL (dummy)  0.076 0.265 0.076 0.265 0.073 0.260 
Region West of NL (dummy)  0.529 0.499 0.526 0.499 0.578 0.494 
Region East of NL (dummy)  0.190 0.392  0.190  0.392 0.175 0.380 
Personal characteristics 
Male (dummy)  0.447 0.497  0.444 0.497 0.514 0.500 
Age  (years  effective  range  21-30)  26.025 1.729 26.012 1.724 26.388 1.834 
Parents’ education level (normalized average)  0.000 1.000  -0.0082  0.978 0.206 1.033 
Risk attitude in year 2003 (n=6077)1  22.757 20.034 22.471 19.796 29.952 24.238 
Human capital characteristics 
Secondary degree with academic orientation 
(dummy) 
0.522  0.500 0.5235 0.499 0.4799 0.500 
Secondary education, GPA (scale  1-10)  6.957 0.600 6.957 .6005 6.958 .5819 
# languages studied in secondary school   2.864  .825  2.8639  .8237  2.886  .8616 
# science subjects studied in secondary school  2.295 1.3494  2.3024  1.3499 2.110 1.3236 
Tertiary degree Msc (dummy)  0.513  0.500 0.5171 0.500 0.4154 0.493 
Tertiary education, GPA (scale 1-10)   7.177  .529 7.172 .5268 7.275  .583 
1Risk attitude is measured in terms of the stated reservation price to participate in a lottery where the bet is winning 1000 
euro with a probability of 10%. Thus, risk aversion would imply a reservation price below 100. The question is included 
in the questionnaire of 2003 only, see Section 4.2. 
 
 
4.   Estimation results 
 
In this section we will first test the propositions resulting from the model. We will then test the assumptions 
underlying the model and perform robustness checks. 
 
 
                                                 
16 The table suggests that the likelihood of being self-employed is higher for males who are older (in a range from 21 
to 30), have lower levels of risk aversion, parents with higher education levels and a bachelor degree with high 
grades.   14
4.1  Testing of propositions: The effect of the wage distribution in the labor market segment on the choice for self-employment  
We have estimated four specifications, determined by excluding outlying segments or not, combined with 
scaling the distribution moments or not. In Table 6, we estimate the choice equation at the aggregate level of 
field of education. The dependent variable, P[SE]k , is the fraction in segment k that is self-employed 20 
months after graduation. Control variables are average values per labor market segment.  Table 7 shows the 
results of a probit model at the individual level, with standard errors clustered by labor market segments. The 
effects shown are marginal effects, i.e. the percentage increase in the probability of self-employment, P[SE]i , 
when increasing the regressor by one unit (measured for an individual in the sample with average values for 
all regressors). As controls we use labor market dummies (regions and years) and personal characteristics 
(gender, age and parental education levels).
17 
18  
Our preferred specification excludes the four outlying segments, uses unscaled moments and is 
estimated on individual data using the controls specified in the previous section. Excluding the segments 
mitigates the multicollinearity problem, unscaled moments are closest to the specification we derived in 
Section 2 and individual data are most suited to control for individual characteristics. As Table 7, panel B, 
shows, our predictions are fully supported.  The first and the third moment of the wage distribution have a 
significantly negative effect on the inclination to choose self-employment, the second moment has a 
significant positive effect. As the corresponding results in Table 7, panel A show, the results are not affected 
by including controls.  If we estimate at the aggregate level of the labor market segment (Table 6) we get 
essentially the same results, whether we include controls or not (except for loss of significance in one case).  
Scaling the distribution parameters does not affect the key conclusions: we still get significant 
confirmation of the predicted signs. The coefficients of the first moment decline by roughly 40%. The 
coefficients of the other moments increase, as should be expected: if the value of a regressor falls from 
dividing by a scaling factor, the value of the estimated coefficient will go up. Across all the specifications, the 
coefficient of the second moment increases roughly by a factor 40 in absolute value and the coefficient of the 
third moment by a factor 20.  Judged by the mean values of the moments in Table 3, one would predict 
increases by a factor 25 and 15, respectively.
19 Of course, the whole purpose of the rescaling is to get away 
from multicollinearity and not to rescale by the same constant for all observations. But the calculation 
suggests that the effect of rescaling is more or less in the ballpark that one might expect and that reducing 
multicollinearity does not dramatically upset parameter estimates.  
The effect of excluding the four extreme labor market segments on estimated parameter values is 
very small and reduces the significance level in just a few cases, as can be seen from all pairwise comparisons. 
                                                 
17 Risk attitude is added as a regressor to the equation in a later stage when testing our assumptions. Its inclusion 
reduces the size of the sample to ten percent only due to the fact that it has been measured in year 2003 only. The 
set of human capital variables will be added to the equation later as well. 
18 Due to the low number of observations at the aggregate level of labor market segments, we do not include the 
sets of average labor market characteristics and average personal controls simultaneously into the regression 
equations. 
19 The mean value of 
2
w  is 6, the value of  / ww  at mean values is 2.4/10; thus rescaling at these mean values 
would predict an increase by a factor 25.     15
This confirms the conclusion from the scaling exercise: we have no indications that multicollinearity renders 
our estimates essentially unreliable.  
 
Table 6  
The fraction of self-employed and the wage distribution in a labor market segment (OLS at the k-level) 
Panel A    No controls 
Dependent: P[SE]k     k=118  k=114 
  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments 
  Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err.
w  -.0336*** .0067 -.0182*** .0058 -.0297*** .0064 -.0179*** .0055 
w
2  .0231*** .0035 .8154*** .1179 .0182*** .0038 .7012*** .1296 
w
3  -.0010*** .0002 -.0213*** .0056 -.0008*** .0003 -.0167*** .0053 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.0000 
R2 0.3292  0.2976  0.2163 0.2415 
Panel B    Labor market characteristics included as controls 
Dependent: P[SE]k      k=118  k=114 
  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments 
  Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err.
w  -.0361*** .0070 -.0206*** .0063 -.0315*** .0067 -.0195*** .0059 
w
2  .0224*** .0034 .8159*** .1184 .0178*** .0037 .6785*** .1290 
w
3  -.0010*** .0002 -.0191*** .0059  -.0007** .0003 -.0139** .0055 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.0000  0.0000 
R2 0.4404  0.4084  0.3681 0.3807 
Panel C    Personal characteristics included as controls 
Dependent: P[SE]k      k=118  k=114 
  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments 
  Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err.
w  -.0383*** .0080 -.0219*** .0066 -.0323*** .0077 -.0221*** .0065 
w
2  .0171*** .0035 .6280*** .1261 .0126*** .0037 .4968*** .1337 
w
3  -.0006** .0002 -.0115** .0055  -.0004 .0003  -.0090*  .0052 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.4655  0.4329  0.3670 0.3703 
The p-values are based on robust standard errors. A significant coefficient at the 10% (5%) [1%] 
level is denoted by * (**) [***]. A constant term is included in all equations.  
 
 
4.2  Testing of assumptions and robustness checks  
 
Definition of labor market segments 
As noted in the introduction, the validity of our approach hinges on a sensible definition of labor market 
segments. Table 3 already indicated that the wage variance within labor market segments is smaller than the 
variance between segments, as one would expect with sensibly defined labor market segments, see the 
Introduction. As a further check on the sensibility of the defined labor market segments, we repeated the 
analyses for 118 ‘labor market segments’ that are formed by random assignment of individuals to segments a   16
hundred times. For these ‘segments’ we didn’t establish any of the joint significant effects of the wage 
distribution in a segment on the occupational choice of individuals within that segment. The relationship 
between self-employment and the moments of the wage distribution is not some mechanical relationship that 
would hold in any arbitrary decomposition of the labor force.  
 
Table 7  
The individual probability of being self-employed and the wage distribution in a labor market segment 
Panel A    Dprobit, clustered by labor market segments, no controls 
Dependent: dummy Self-emp   k= 118, n= 56,138  k=114, n =53,819 
  Unscaled moments Scaled moments  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments 
  Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.
w  -.0244*** .0074 -.0157*** .0059 -.0223*** .0075 -.0122*** .0042 
w
2  .0146*** .0039 .5345*** .1335 .0142*** .0050 .5747*** .1768 
w
3  -.0007*** .0002 -.0158*** .0044 -.0006*** .0002 -.0129*** .0040 
Prob > 
2  0.0000 0.0004 0.0120 0.0032 
Pseudo R
2  0.0546 0.0545 0.0380 0.0439 
Panel B Dprobit, clustered by labor market segments, labor market and personal characteristics included  
Dependent: dummy Self-emp   k=118  K=114 
  Unscaled moments Scaled moments  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments 
  Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.
w  -.0263*** .0067 -.0171*** .005147 -0.0242*** 0.0064  -0.0138*** 0.0037
w
2  .0136*** .0034 .5274*** .11179 0.0136*** 0.0042  0.5590*** 0.1527
w
3  -.0006*** .0002 -.0127*** .00376 -0.0005*** 0.0002  -0.0104*** 0.0036
Prob > 
2  0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.0739 0.0754 0.0593 0.0635 
The p-values are based on robust standard errors. A significant coefficient at the 10% (5%) [1%] 
level is denoted by * (**) [***]. A constant term is included in all equations.  
 
The role and independence of self-employment income distributions in labor market segments 
We have taken the approach of measuring the effect of wage income distributions only, instead of also 
including self-employment income distributions, because the literature has acknowledged that the latter are 
difficult to observe, for various reasons. These reasons apply in our case too. Only a small fraction of the 
sample is self-employed (3.6%), and a large fraction of the self-employed does not reveal their income at all. 
As a consequence, only 50 (19) out of the 118 labor market segments include at least 10 (20) observed 
incomes of self-employed. Moreover, the incomes show a large variance and this may reflect substantial 
measurement error. We have argued that individuals do not base their occupational choice on the self-
employment income distribution within labor market segments, but on the self-employment income 
distribution in general.  
Table 8 and Table 9 show how our results change upon including the first three central moments of 
p into the regression equations. The samples are limited to the 50 labor market segments in which there are at 
least 10 observations of p and to 47 when the sample of k =114 forms the basis. Table 8 shows the results at   17
the level of labor market segments k (comparable to Table 6), whereas Table 9 shows the results at the 
individual level n (comparable to Table 7). The bottom half of both tables shows the benchmark results, i.e., 
when only considering the labor market segments with at least ten observations of p but where the moments 
of p remain excluded.  
 
Table 8  
Adding the first three moments of the self-employment income distribution per segment at level k 
Panel A  The central moments of the self-employment income distribution included where np>=10 
Dependent: P[SE]k   k= 50  k= 47 
  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments  Unscaled moments Scaled moments 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err. 
w  -.0476*** .0144  -.0238* .01227 -.0408*** .0139 -.0258** .0113 
w
2  .0287*** .0068 .9253*** .2307  .0166* .0098  .8571***  .2762 
w
3  -.0013*** .0004  -.0249  .0175  -.0004 .0010 -.0083 .0168 
p  -.0082 .0054  -.0094** .0041 -.0056 .0052 -.0046 .0040 
 p
2  3.55e-06 .0005  .0094  .0706 -.0002 .0005 -.0504 .0648 
p
3  2.10e-06 6.15e-06  .0161 .0128  3.31e-06  6.61e-06 .0210* .0121 
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0109 0.0019 
R
2  0.4639 0.4590 0.3269 0.3938 
Panel B  The benchmark where np>=10 
Dependent: P[SE]k   k= 50  k= 47 
  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments  Unscaled moments Scaled moments 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err. 
w  -0.0567*** 0.0127  -0.033** 0.0116 -0.0463*** 0.0128 -0.0305*** 0.0106 
w
2  0.0313*** 0.0063  1.0617*** 0.2403 0.0193** 0.0092 0.8383*** 0.2751 
w
3  -0.0014*** 0.0004  -0.0317* 0.0175 -0.0006 0.0010 -0.0101 0.0167 
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0002  0.0022  0.0012 
R
2  0.4270 0.3426 0.2854 0.3059 
 
The tables show that our essential conclusion on the signs of the moments is not affected by the inclusion of 
the p-moments into the equations but that we loose precision, as one might expect with strong reduction in 
the number of observations. In addition, the moments of p themselves hardly affect the occupational choices 
of individuals. This lack of results is in line with previous findings and with the model we have proposed.  
The results shown in Tables 8 and 9 include only those labor market segments with sufficient 
numbers of entrepreneurs, i.e., np>=10. This may lead to a biased sample excluding labor market segments 
with few entrepreneurs. In Table 10, we check our results for the full sample with self-employment 
income measures calculated for 13 segments. The segments are aggregates, for self-employment income 
only, of fields of education that are intrinsically related (e.g. fields in engineering, in teaching, in arts) and 
add up to sufficient number of self-employed to calculate moments of the income distribution (see the 
second column of tables A1 and A2). Thus, the underlying assumption is now that individuals assess self-  18
employment income from a set of related fields, instead of lumping all fields together (for instance, 
business economics, creative therapy, electrical engineering, etc).  
 
Table 9  
Adding the first three moments of the entrepreneurial income distribution per segment at level n 
Panel A    Dprobit, clustered by labor market segments, moments of p added to panel B of Table 7, where np>=10
Dep: dummyEntr      k= 50, n = 29,019  k=47, n = 27,398 
  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.
w  -.0318*** .0096 -.0168** .0072  -0.0269*** 0.0096  -0.0126** 0.0063
w
2  .0168*** .0044 .5476*** .1466  0.0128* 0.0078  0.7053*** 0.1923
w
3  -.0007*** .0002  -.0111  .0098  -0.0001 0.0006  -0.0067 0.0083
p    -.0066* .0038  -.0071**  .0023  -0.0051 0.0036  -0.0004*  0.0022
w
2  -.00004 .0003 -.0112 .0484  -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0547  0.0388
w
3  2.08e-06 3.08e-06  .0145* .0087  1.97E-06 3.25E-06  0.0213  0.0074
Prob > 
2  0.0000 0.0000  0.0013  0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0670  0.0733  0.0527  0.0657 
Panel B    The benchmark, Dprobit, clustered by labor market segments where np>=10 
Dep: dummyEntr      k= 50, n = 29,019  k=47, n = 27,398 
  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.
w  -.0421*** 0.0114  -.0283*** 0.0101  -.0348*** 0.0112  .0209*** 0.0069 
w
2  .0205*** 0.0053  .7433*** 0.2276  .0158** 0.0080  .7569*** 0.2700 
w
3  -.0009*** 0.0003  -.0228* 0.013  -.0003* 0.0006  -.0087 0.0101 
Prob > 
2  0.0000 0.001  0.0023 0.0006 
Pseudo R2 0.0612  0.0556  0.0474  0.0506 
 
When we include the first three central moments of the entrepreneurial income distribution from 
the 13 segments, we get basically the same results as before. The moments of the wage distribution 
maintain their predicted signs when we include self-employment income moments, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients barely change and the self-employment income moments themselves have no significant 
effect. Only the first moment of the wage distribution looses significance, in case of scaled moments. 
Once again we find significant effects of opportunity cost and no effects of the self-employment income 
distribution.
20  
                                                 
20 We also noted that our estimates are still unbiased if the distribution of self-employment income within a segment is 
independent of the distribution of wages. In all other cases, our estimates may be biased. The bias would be downwards 
in the case of a positive correlation and upwards in the case of a negative correlation. Table 11 shows our estimates, 
necessarily based on a modest number of observations. The correlations are positive, but quite small. Comparing the 
results in Tables 6 and 7 with those in 8, 9 and 10 indicates that including the p-moments in large majority leads to higher 
estimated coefficients of the moments of the wage distribution moments. This is in line with underestimation when we 
omit variables that correlate positively.  When we compare the point estimates, in Table 8 and Table 9, for estimation 
excluding and including self-employment income, their ratio’s are mostly around 1.2 to 1.3, which would be compatible 
with omitted variable bias at equal coefficients and the correlations as measured in Table 11. We conclude that the results 
we have presented for the full sample, if biased, are mostly likely an underestimate of the true effect of opportunity costs.    19
 
 
Table 10  
Adding the moments of the p-distribution with an alternative definition of labor market segments 
Dprobit, clustered by alternative labor market segments, moments of p added to panel B of Table 7 
Dep: dummyEntr      k= 118, 13 clusters, n = 56,138  k=114, 13 clusters, n = 53,819 
  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.
w  -.01934**  .0096 -.0092 .0062  -.0176* .0092 -.0085  0.0063
w
2  .0126***  .0037 .4607*** .1088  .0127*** .0045  .5403*** 0.1666
w
3  -.0005*** .0002 -.0120*** .0043  -.00050*** .0002  -.0116*** 0.0040
p _ alt  -.0046 .0067 -.0063 .0051  -.0039 .0074 -.0030 .0062
 p _ alt
2   -.00001 .0011  .0283  .0495  -.0000 .0011  .0132 .0521
p _ alt
3   -4.98e-07 .0001  -.0004  .0049  6.02e-07 .0000  -.0013  .0043
Prob > 
2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0170  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.0566 0.0612 0.0400  0.0456 
 
 
Table 11  
Correlations between the moments of the w- and p-distributions in labor market segments*   
  k=118 labor market segments (50)  k=114 labor market segments (47) 
   0.396 0.382 

2  0.197 0.205 

3  0.232 0.113 
   0.213 0.026 

3 
3   0.018 -0.120 
*The correlations that involve an element of the distribution of entrepreneurial incomes have been calculated for the 
sample of 50 (47) labor market segments (out of the original 118 or 114) in which there are at least 10 entrepreneurial 
incomes observed.  
 
4.3 Potential sources of bias 
Biased moments  
In our statistical analysis we use moments of the wage distribution as observed in the data. The distribution is 
realized after choices have been made and an individual may have private information on the distribution that 
will apply in his/her particular case. Correction for selectivity bias may be essential if one wants to retrieve the 
true risk that an individual is facing but the key question here is to what extent this is relevant for the 
individual’s decision making. Econometric corrections for selectivity bias are often quite sensitive to 
specification and generally not very robust (eg. Chen, 2008; Mazza, Van Ophem and Hartog, 2010) but direct 
assessments of individuals’ information on future incomes point in a single direction: there is no evidence 
that individuals systematically correct observations for private information (see for example Betts, 1996; 
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Dominitz and Manski, 1996; Brunello, Lucifora and Winter-Ebmer, 2004; Webbink and Hartog, 2004; 
Wolter and Weber, 2004; Schweri, Hartog and Wolter, 2011).    
Omitted variables  
Omitted variables, if correlated with a regressor, will lead to a biased estimate of the effect of that regressor. 
Variables that directly come to mind are risk attitude and human capital or ability. Both are known to affect 
the choice for entrepreneurship, are likely to affect the choice for a degree field and are also likely to affect 
(preferred) expected levels and variances of the wage distribution.  
A comparison of Panel A with Panel B in Table 7 may be considered a first test of the possible 
effects of the omission of risk attitude. It shows that including controls for, among others, gender and age 
hardly affect the estimates of the coefficients of the first three moments of the wage distribution. Males are 
known to be less reluctant to take risks and risk aversion increases when people get older (Hartog et al., 
2002). The estimates stand this first test. 
A second test exploits the fact that our dataset includes an indicator of (stated) risk preference. 
Respondents were asked to value participation in a hypothetical lottery paying out €1000 with a 10 percent 
chance. Unfortunately, this indicator is available for only one out of the 10 waves of graduates in our sample 
(see Table 5 and its footnote). The average willingness to pay for participation in this hypothetical lottery 
reported by 6077 graduates was €22.8 (median €15), see Table 5. Thus, on average, the respondents in our 
sample are risk averse. The reported maximum was €99. The reservation price for participating in such a 
hypothetical lottery has been shown to be a valid (inverse) indicator of risk aversion and behavior under risk 
(see Cramer et al., 2002; Dohmen et al., 2011; Hartog et al., 2002). Table 5 shows that the average reservation 
price in the sample of entrepreneurs is significantly higher than in the sample of employees (€29.95 versus 
€22.47) in line with earlier applications (Cramer et al., 2002).  
We replicate the analysis of Table 7 for this single wave of graduates and then include the stated risk 
preference variable as an additional regressor in the equation, see Panel A of Table 7 and Table 12.
21 The 
results show a clear positive correlation between self-employment and the lottery reservation price. But 
what’s more important, the estimated coefficients for the wage moments are not affected by the inclusion of 
a (strongly significant) risk preference variable; the magnitudes and standard errors only marginally different 







                                                 
21 The replicated results for this wave compare well to the results presented in Table 7. Significance levels drop 
slightly due to the smaller sample, but conclusions remain unaltered. These results are not shown in Table 12. 
22 Actually, our model indicates that risk attitude should not be included as a separate regressor: risk attitude is 
reflected in the regression coefficients for variance and skew. Thus, the key issue is not an omitted variable problem 
but coefficient heterogeneity. In the single wave we have data for, we interacted variance and risk attitude. Results 
were in the right direction (smaller effects for the less risk averse) but statistically weak.   21
 
 
Table 12  
The effect of controlling for a measure of risk attitude at the individual level   
A risk attitude measure added to Panel B of Table 7 
Dependent: dummy Entr      k=118, n = 6,077  k=114, n = 5,835 
  Unscaled moments Scaled moments  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments 
  Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.
w  -.0296*** .0092 -.0187*** .0075 -0.0283*** 0.0093  -0.0159*** 0.0056
w
2  .0168*** .0044 .6018*** .1594  0.0168*** 0.0059  0.6314*** 0.2216
w
3  -.0008*** .0002 -.0183*** .0057 -0.0007*** 0.0003  -0.0147*** 0.0053
Lottery reservation price  .0006***  .0001  .0006*** .0001 0.0006*** 0.0001  0.0006***  0.0001
Prob > 
2  0.0000 0.000  0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.1087 0.1034  0.0842  0.0880 
The p-values are based on robust standard errors. A significant coefficient at the 10% (5%) [1%] 
level is denoted by * (**) [***]. A constant term is included in all equations.  
 
Another stylized fact from the empirical entrepreneurship literature indicates that ability or, more in general 
human capital, affects the choice for entrepreneurship (Parker, 2009). Human capital might also induce 
people to choose certain degree fields and thereby affect the income distribution. Thus, human capital is the 
second obvious candidate to possibly confound our results. Table 13 shows that this is not the case. The 
analysis shown in Table 7 Panel B is repeated with inclusion of a set of human capital factors.
23 The estimated 
coefficients of the three measures characterizing the wage distribution show the same pattern as before. 
 
Table 13  
The effect of controlling for measures of human capital at the individual level   
Human capital controls added to panel B of Table 7 
Dependent: dummy Entr   k= 118, n = 56,138  k=114, n =53,819 
  Unscaled moments Scaled moments  Unscaled moments Scaled moments 
  Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err.
w  -.0259*** .0071 -.0158*** .0053 -0.0241*** 0.0067 -0.0130*** 0.0044
w
2  .0129*** .0032 .4983*** .1031 0.0130*** 0.0040 0.5290*** 0.1454
w
3  -.0005*** .0002 -.0122*** .0035  -0.0004** 0.0002 -0.0102*** 0.0036
Pseudo R
2  0.0771 0.0792 0.0619 0.066 
The p-values are based on robust standard errors. A significant coefficient at the 10% (5%) [1%] level is 
denoted by * (**) [***]. A constant term is included in all equations. The human capital controls included here 
are listed in Table 5 (type of degree, grades, courses). 
 
Field of education as a source of bias 
Our data use income distribution moments grouped by type of education (academic discipline, field of 
education). Hence, we observe wage data for individuals who have chosen a particular field of education and 
                                                 
23 The most obvious measures of human capital (education level and experience), are already controlled for in our sample 
of graduates from tertiary education at the start of their career.  
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we relate self-employment status to wage observations belonging to these preselected fields. What may go 
wrong here?   
Consider taste for risk. Other things equal, a risk lover will choose an education track generating 
incomes with high variance more often. Risk lovers will also choose self-employment more often. Then self-
employment will correlate positively with income variance across educations. We find indeed a positive 
correlation between self-employment and wage variance. However, the argument requires furthermore that 
the variance in the wage and self-employment income distributions correlate positively, for which we find 
only weak evidence in our data, see Table 11. Another observation required for the validity of this argument, 
to the extent that the labor market compensates for risk taking (Hartog, 2011), is that variance will be 
correlated positively with the mean income in a segment. This would generate a positive correlation between 
self-employment and mean income, contrary to what we find. As risk lovers would be attracted to high skew 
educations, we would also find positive correlation between skew and self-employment, again contrary to 
what we find. Thus, this potential spurious link runs counter to two of our three key findings.  
Consider an omitted relevant ability that stimulates self-employment (e.g. the ability for fast and 
robust decision making). If this ability also stimulates to choose an education field with higher productivity as 
a wage earner, we would see a positive correlation between mean wage and self-employment; we find the 
opposite. The higher ability may reduce wage variance, as abler workers make fewer errors and have better 
foresight of pitfalls and dangers of failure; this would again predict the opposite of what we find, a negative 
correlation between self-employment and variance.  
Omitted moments  
In the introduction we noted that previous studies may have found no effect of income on occupational 
choice because they only include one (or two) moments of the relevant income distribution. We test this 
presumption for the specifications of Panel B of Table 7, see Table 14.  
 
Table 14  
Including fewer moments of the wage distribution at the individual level   
Excluding  w
3
 from the equation of panel B, Table 7 
Dependent: dummy Entr   K= 118, n = 56,138  k=114, n =53,819 
  Unscaled moments  Scaled moments  Unscaled moments Scaled moments 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err.
w  -.0204*** .0075 -.0133*** .0053 -0.0202*** 0.0063 -0.0113*** 0.0037
w
2  .0046*** .0015 .3898*** .1025 0.0091*** 0.0034 0.4339*** 0.1545
Pseudo R




 from the equation of panel B, Table 7 
Dependent: dummy Entr   K= 118, n = 56,138  k=114, n =53,819 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
w  -0.0032 .0067  -0.0116**  .0055 
Pseudo R
2  0.0167                              0.0234 
The p-values are based on robust standard errors. A significant coefficient at the 10% (5%) [1%] level is 
denoted by * (**) [***]. A constant term is included in all equations. The human capital controls included here 
are listed in Table 5.   23
The first moment has no effect on status choice if we omit the second and the third moment, just as in the 
earlier literature. As the top panel shows, substantial change in the estimated coefficient of the first moment 




We set out to provide an understanding of the remarkable lack of support in the self-employment literature 
for the effect of financial returns on the decision to select self-employment above wage employment. Various 
explanations have been put forth for this puzzling lack of support. It is hard to believe that preferences for 
income entirely cease to play a role for the labor market choice between salaried and self-employment.  
  One explanation is that income data for the self-employed are poor and difficult to compare to wage 
earnings. Another explanation is that, besides the mean, variance and skew of the earnings distributions are 
also different and may drive the choice between these options. We try to address these empirical issues with a 
sample of recent graduates from tertiary education in the Netherlands. This sample is homogeneous with 
respect to age, education level and labor market experience and can be divided, based on degree fields, into 
labor market segments with their own wage distributions.   
  We find robust support for the effect of opportunity cost (moments of the wage distribution) and 
no significant effect of the financial returns to self-employment. Lower mean, higher variance and lower skew 
of the wage distribution for an individual’s type of education increase the probability of self-employment. 
Robustness checks suggest that the conclusion is quite solid and that our estimates are more likely to give an 
underestimate than an overestimate. Lack of support for the moments of the self-employment income 
distribution is compatible with measurement error blurring estimated coefficients. It is also compatible with a 
blurred vision of the subjects themselves. The significant effects of opportunity cost of self-employment do 
indicate however, that the choice for self-employment is guided by financial incentives. Empirical research 
seeking to distinguish econometric problems of estimation under measurement errors and ignorance cum 
indifference among subjects would be a challenging next step.     24
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 Table A1. Descriptive statistics of fields of study (Bachelor) 

















Business Economics/Business Sciences   Economics  653 0.012  0.0262  0.0029  2.221  10.23  625  11.61  7 
Commerce   Economics  586 0.031  0.0301  0.0050  2.215  9.60  554  11.37  15 
Business Informatics   Economics  671 0.031  0.0278  0.0032  2.250  10.14  642  11.86  18 
Communication   Economics  597 0.050  0.0314  0.0032  2.218  9.66  557  10.24  26 
Accountancy   Economics  558 0.005  0.0315  0.0026  2.224  10.23  525  6.81  1 
International Business and Languages   Economics  433 0.007  0.0275  0.0043  2.192  9.34  418  9.79  2 
Tourism & Leisure   Economics  475 0.013  0.0338  0.0049  2.110  9.32  455  8.92  4 
Hotel Management   Economics  531 0.026  0.0295  0.0036  2.190  9.59  509  9.50  13 
Small Business and Retail Management   Economics  335 0.093  0.0356  0.0045  2.224  10.32  289  9.21  23 
Management, Economics & Law   Economics  525 0.015  0.0280  0.0020  2.212  9.99  503  10.56  4 
Logistics & Economics   Economics  649 0.014  0.0277  0.0035  2.217  10.17  620  8.81  7 
Facility Services   Economics  612 0.023  0.0279  0.0034  2.191  9.63  596  14.19  13 
Journalism  Journalism  587 0.177  0.0346  0.0010  2.248  10.24  508  11.15  85 
Business Management   Economics  163 0.049  0.0209  0.0012  2.233  9.60  153  14.21  5 
Fiscal Economics   Economics  269 0.019  0.0356  0.0025  2.258  10.27  260  7.42  4 
European professions   Economics  177 0.028  0.0349  0.0042  2.209  9.63  164  8.88  4 
Leisure Management   Economics  213 0.042  0.0352  0.0055  2.143  9.14  196  8.44  8 
International Business & Management   Economics  73 0.055  0.0369  0.0021  2.223  9.79  66  4.48  2 
Real Estate   Economics  121 0.033  0.0382  0.0041  2.191  9.18  119  3.36  1 
Marketing management   Economics  69 0.058  0.0293  0.0033  2.205  9.44  64  10.71  3 
Personnel & Labour   Social sciences  575 0.023  0.0284  0.0027  2.232  9.92  550  16.10  12 
Socio-Cultural Studies  Social sciences  499 0.048  0.0342  0.0025  2.211  9.60  457  8.91  18 
Social Work & Services  Social sciences  624 0.011  0.0218  0.0006  2.278  10.22  599  7.49  6 
Social Pedagogy  Social sciences  908 0.013  0.0263  0.0021  2.217  9.78  858  8.88  11 
Socio-Legal Services  Social sciences  414 0.010  0.0234  0.0027  2.255  10.10  397  8.39  4 
Information Management  Social sciences  385 0.016  0.0311  0.0037  2.205  9.65  366  8.30  3 
Creative Therapy  Social sciences  162 0.056  0.0369  0.0029  2.251  9.98  147  9.48  7 
Medical Laboratory Technician  (Para) medical  569 0.005  0.0232  0.0042  2.157  9.04  547  8.10  3 
Nursing  (Para) medical  882 0.010  0.0200  0.0018  2.241  10.07  847  9.76  8 
Physiotherapy  (Para) medical  724 0.057  0.0284  -0.0003  2.358  14.34  642  16.33  30 
Speech Therapy  (Para) medical  568 0.067  0.0315  0.0033  2.239  11.42  489  18.40  32 
Nutrition & Dietetics  (Para) medical  568 0.019  0.0295  0.0036  2.237  10.11  529  11.16  9   28
Table A1 (Continued) Descriptive statistics of fields of study (Bachelor)  
Ergotherapy  (Para) medical  709 0.082  0.0258  0.0017 2.283  10.79  623  13.18  43 
Medical Imaging & Radiotherapy  (Para) medical  259 0.004  0.0121  0.0012 2.212 9.19  252  8.23  1 
Oral Hygiene  (Para) medical  105 0.057  0.0154  0.0004 2.339  11.79  94  26.40  3 
Environmenal Management/Technology  Agriculture  438 0.018  0.0287  0.0032 2.236 9.79  414  12.96  6 
Agri-Business  Agriculture  365 0.033  0.0255  0.0031 2.237 9.64  334  11.51  11 
Animal Husbandry  Agriculture  433 0.095  0.0480  0.0082 2.151 9.46  380  7.14  21 
Food Technology  Agriculture  98  0.000  0.0284  0.0034  2.245  9.80  96                 0 
Horticulture & agriculture  Agriculture  59 0.186  0.0392  -0.0023 2.161 8.86  48  10.49  5 
Primary School Teacher   Teaching  896 0.004  0.0190  0.0016 2.285  10.78  812  8.20  3 
Physical Education Teacher, Grade 1  Teaching  472 0.023  0.0364  0.0010 2.314  11.41  432  11.96  10 
Dutch Teacher  Teaching  320 0.031  0.0320  0.0043 2.283  10.70  302  10.42  7 
Economics Teacher (general & business)  Teaching  370 0.019  0.0271  0.0024 2.259  10.66  351  8.37  6 
Special Needs Teacher  Teaching  392  0.000  0.0183  0.0013  2.299  10.33  356                 0 
Social Studies Teacher  Teaching  93 0.022  0.0311  0.0064 2.200 9.24  91  13.11  2 
Education  Teaching  276 0.011  0.0263  0.0012 2.256  10.53  256  29.50  3 
Science Teacher  Teaching  452 0.007  0.0275  0.0017 2.316  10.92  434  6.37  2 
Geography/History Teacher  Teaching  497 0.026  0.0419  0.0036 2.280  10.98  471  10.13  10 
Arts & Crafts Teacher  Teaching  86 0.128  0.0540  0.0094 2.186 9.60  69  9.20  10 
English/French/German Teacher  Teaching  603 0.013  0.0378  0.0030 2.294  11.58  558  8.59  6 
Visual Arts & Design  Teaching  678 0.354  0.0453  0.0027 2.148 9.81  426  7.66  152 
Music  Arts  329 0.368  0.0492  -0.0001 2.288  12.42  179  11.71  68 
Theater  Arts  98 0.204  0.0314  0.0027 2.130 9.28  72  11.76  12 
Dance  Arts  60 0.200  0.1231  0.0050 1.976 9.13  39  9.50  9 
Chemcial Technician   Engineering  240 0.008  0.0306  0.0047 2.180 9.05  226  7.50  2 
Structural Engineering   Engineering  506 0.020  0.0251  0.0041 2.206 9.35  474  8.98  9 
Electrical Engineering   Engineering  453 0.026  0.0258  0.0039 2.247 9.75  430  8.36  8 
Civil Engineering   Engineering  430 0.007  0.0271  0.0048 2.216 9.84  410  7.27  2 
Chemical Engineering   Engineering  651 0.011  0.0236  0.0031 2.248 9.99  625  9.38  6 
Applied Informatics   Engineering  862 0.057  0.0272  0.0031 2.250  10.11  788  10.55  38 
Mechanical Engineering   Engineering  442 0.020  0.0306  0.0044 2.225 9.76  418  10.70  9 
Naval Officer   Engineering  98 0.010  0.0756  0.0105 2.097 9.11  87  8.45  1 
Physics Engineering   Engineering  99 0.010  0.0194  0.0019 2.243 9.59  91  16.80  1 
Fashion Management and Technology   Engineering  160 0.081  0.0322  0.0049 2.160  10.17  145  9.35  9 
Car Technology   Engineering  112 0.018  0.0242  0.0038 2.243  10.70  107  1.82  2   29
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Dutch  Humanities/Languages  549  0.0729 0.0267 0.0019  2.294  10.67  508  11.20  30 
English  Humanities/Languages  441  0.0680 0.0362 0.0021  2.263  10.77  399  11.84  24 
Other languages  Humanities/Languages  356  0.0534 0.0342 0.0018  2.252  10.81  328  9.08  15 
Philosophy/Theology  Humanities/Languages  189  0.0899 0.0387 0.0000  2.299  10.52  162  10.73  12 
History  Humanities/Languages  571  0.0490 0.0338 0.0007  2.277  10.59  527  11.11  23 
Language & Culture (general) Humanities/Languages  395  0.0582 0.0315 0.0021  2.255  10.09  374  9.79  19 
Art History & Archaeology  Humanities/Languages  265  0.1019 0.0362 0.0035  2.221  9.44  235  8.67  19 
Corporate Communications  Humanities/Languages  334  0.0120 0.0233 0.0015  2.255  10.01  323  15.02  4 
European Studies  Humanities/Languages  68  0.0294 0.0225 0.0040  2.243  10.12  67  5.56  2 
Film, Television & Theatre   Humanities/Languages  146  0.1301 0.0459 0.0041  2.235  10.59  123  11.12  14 
Alpha Information science  Humanities/Languages  305  0.0492 0.0255 0.0013  2.286  10.46  286  9.21  9 
Chemistry  Techn/Engineering  516  0.0039 0.0367 0.0043  2.199  9.64  502  7.92  2 
Computer Science  Techn/Engineering  319  0.0439 0.0306 0.0022  2.301  10.42  298  14.51  10 
Biology  Techn/Engineering  779  0.0282 0.0361 0.0015  2.193  9.62  748  11.12  16 
Pharmacy  Techn/Engineering  503  0.0298 0.0244 -0.0012 2.427  12.58  465  14.88  13 
Pure Mathematics/Physics   Techn/Engineering  533  0.0131 0.0366 0.0027  2.224  9.98  519  9.05  6 
Agricultural Science  Techn/Engineering  67  0.0299 0.0214 0.0021  2.337  10.86  63  9.00  1 
Chemi/Techn Agri-sciences  Techn/Engineering  357  0.0280 0.0271 0.0019  2.277  10.19  332  8.73  7 
Bioprocessing & Food Tech  Techn/Engineering  692  0.0159 0.0333 0.0016  2.259  10.23  660  9.21  9 
Architecture  Techn/Engineering  820  0.0512 0.0213 0.0022  2.296  10.74  771  12.41  32 
Mechanical Engineering  Techn/Engineering  747  0.0134 0.0217 0.0010  2.352  11.32  702  11.27  9 
Electrical Engineering  Techn/Engineering  458  0.0240 0.0219 0.0008  2.345  11.30  428  17.08  8 
Chemical Engineering  Techn/Engineering  555  0.0126 0.0291 0.0014  2.330  10.96  540  20.59  4 
Civil Engineering  Techn/Engineering  720  0.0181 0.0180 0.0016  2.329  10.83  695  14.80  9 
Technology & Management  Techn/Engineering  747  0.0281 0.0201 0.0005  2.385  11.59  696  9.03  19 
Industrial Design  Techn/Engineering  416  0.1226 0.0240 0.0016  2.299  10.32  365  11.04  38 
Aerospace Engineering  Techn/Engineering  146  0.0411 0.0218 0.0012  2.359  10.79  138  12.23  4 
Applied Computer Science  Techn/Engineering  364  0.0632 0.0193 0.0012  2.328  10.73  331  9.85  19 
Applied Math/Physics   Techn/Engineering  674  0.0089 0.0312 0.0013  2.287  10.40  647  13.06  5 
Economics  Economics&law  1502  0.0220 0.0250 0.0007  2.349  11.32  1435  14.12  29 
Business Science  Economics&law  808  0.0186 0.0241 0.0007  2.352  11.39  775  11.71  11 
Econometrics  Economics&law  509  0.0138 0.0260 -0.0006 2.360  11.75  492  11.90  6   30
Table A2 (Continued) Descriptive statistics of fields of study (Master) 
Fiscal Economics  Economics&law  218 0.0138  0.0161  0.0001  2.420  11.72  208 9.82  1 
Business Administration  Economics&law  835 0.0335  0.0224  0.0001  2.355  11.52  783  10.81  26 
Dutch Law  Economics&law  1078 0.0176  0.0210  0.0010  2.341  11.29  1028  10.11  14 
Notarial Law  Economics&law  467 0.0064  0.0273  0.0012  2.339  10.97  449 4.97  1 
Fiscal Law  Economics&law  509 0.0118  0.0175  0.0000  2.414  12.38  494  20.89  4 
International Law  Economics&law  71  0.0000  0.0275  -0.0005  2.332  10.71  69                 0 
Healthcare  Health  782 0.0128  0.0300  0.0002  2.316  10.90  740  13.26  8 
Medicine  Health  998 0.0070  0.0237  -0.0003  2.416  11.92  975  27.02  6 
Biomedical Sciences  Health  610 0.0082  0.0274  0.0013  2.238  9.76  590  11.83  5 
Veterinary Science  Health  278 0.0612  0.0232  0.0000  2.369  11.19  253 9.76  12 
Sociology  Social sciences  491 0.0305  0.0294  -0.0001  2.304  10.50  470  11.97  9 
Psychology  Social sciences  1093 0.0357  0.0358  0.0001  2.305  10.92  1037  17.52  34 
Politics  Social sciences  463 0.0454  0.0265  -0.0004  2.341  11.21  440  10.78  18 
Education Science  Social sciences  698 0.0143  0.0295  0.0004  2.336  11.73  661  13.45  8 
(Applied) Education   Social sciences  380 0.0342  0.0232  0.0010  2.336  11.17  354  12.41  12 
Cultural Anthropology  Social sciences  367 0.0436  0.0340  0.0018  2.249  10.64  347  12.48  15 
Communication  Social sciences  705 0.0369  0.0260  0.0018  2.300  10.63  663  12.45  20 
Socio-Cultural Science   Social sciences  779 0.0257  0.0259  0.0013  2.315  10.69  750 9.93  17 
Public Administration  Social sciences  1080 0.0194  0.0223  0.0008  2.361  11.30  1032  12.13  19 
Human Geography & Plann Social sciences  1069 0.0178  0.0241  0.0008  2.309  10.47  1026  12.04  16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 